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WADE H. McCREE, JR.: A COMPASSIONATE 
AND GREAT JUDGE 
Horace W. Gilmore* 
Wade H. McCree, Jr. served as a judge for nearly twenty-three 
years. He served seven years as a Wayne County (Michigan) Circuit 
Judge, six years as a United States District Judge, and ten years as a 
United States Court of Appeals Judge. 
He had great respect for the judiciary and its purpose in our soci-
ety. He expressed this view in a speech to the Economic Club of De-
troit on February 4, 1980, when he said: 
Perhaps the real genius of our government is that in its least powerful 
branch with its tradition of self restraint lies the safest potential for reso-
lution of the most divisive issues in the unfinished agenda of our democ-
racy. If this view is correct, then the judges are indeed the ultimate 
guardians of our liberties. 1 
Michigan Governor G. Mennen Williams first recognized Wade 
McCree's talents when he appointed him to be a member of the Work-
men's Compensation Commission in 1952. In 1954, Governor Wil-
liams named him a Judge of the Wayne County Circuit Court.2 In 
1961, President Kennedy appointed him to the federal bench in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In 
1966, President Johnson appointed Judge McCree to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Finally, in 1977, President 
Carter appointed him to the position of United States Solicitor 
General. 
* Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan; Adjunct Lec-
turer of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1939, J.D. 1942, University of Michi-
gan. -Ed. 
I wish to thank the following for their assistance: My two law clerks, Kristen Larcom and 
Patrick Corbett; Hugh Munce (Detroit Legal News, Detroit); and the following former law 
clerks of Judge McCree: Professor Maurice Kelman (Wayne State University Law School); Bar-
bara Klarman (Tilchin & Hall, Farmington Hills); Howard Boigon (Davis, Graham & Stubbs, 
Denver); Paul Levy (Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C.); D. Michael 
Kratchman (Evans & Luptak, Detroit); Jerold D. E. Lax (Schlussel, Lifton, Simon, Rands, Gal-
vin & Jackier, Ann Arbor); Darryl Anderson (O'Donnell, Schwartz & Anderson, Washington, 
D.C.). 
1. Detroit Legal News, Feb. 4, 1980, at 1, col. 1. 
2. Judge McCree was the first Black ever appointed to the circuit court in Michigan. At the 
time of his investiture, Governor Williams was approximately 20 minutes late in arriving and 
was chastised by the then-presiding circuit judge for being late for the ceremony. Governor 
Williams' response was most appropriate: "We have been waiting two hundred years for this 
day, and I do not think twenty minutes more will matter very much." 
231 
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As Otis Smith, McCree's close friend, former Michigan Supreme 
Court Justice, and General Counsel of General Motors,3 stated at the 
time of the Presentation of the Portrait of Judge McCree to the Sixth 
Circuit in 1981: 
When Judge McCree was later to stand the test of a county-wide elec-
tion, his reputation for skill and fairness earned him endorsements from 
many diverse and even mutually hostile groups and as a result he led all 
others in the balloting . 
. . . I know that when lawyers talked about the ablest and fairest trial 
judges in Michigan, among the first to be named always was Judge Wade 
Mccree. Wade was indeed a superb trial judge because he governed, so 
to speak, not merely from rank but from intellect. His exchanges with 
lawyers on some of the more metaphysical properties of the law are sim-
ply priceless.4 
From Wade McCree's first days on the Wayne County Circuit 
Court bench through his service on the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, he possessed a great sense of compassion, and uniformly sought 
within the law to protect individuals and minorities against more pow-
erful interests. He always ruled, however, within the law, and would 
not bend it to protect anyone. He was totally and completely devoted 
to the rule of law. 
Unfortunately, none of Judge McCree's opinions as a Wayne 
County Circuit Judge was published. As a judge in the United States 
District Court, he wrote 19 published opinions, which can be found in 
volumes 199 F. Supp. through 352 F. Supp. While on the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, he wrote 223 published majority opinions, 
which can be found in volumes 341 F.2d through 553 F.2d. During 
the same period of time, he wrote 72 published dissents and 36 pub-
lished concurrences. 
He was probably the most respected judge of the Wayne County 
Circuit Court during the period between 1956 and 1961, when I served 
with him. He was even-handed, thoughtful, and scholarly in every-
thing he did on the bench. He was very active in many of the bench 
committees, serving on the Probation Committee, Friend of the Court 
Committee, and others concerned with court administration. 
Former Chief Judge Edwards, of the Sixth Circuit, speaking at the 
Presentation of the Portrait of Judge McCree, described an episode 
that was typical of McCree's career as a judge. Judge Edwards said: 
I was waiting for an elevator when a lawyer left Judge McCree's court-
3. See 0. Smith, The Quintessemial Public Servant, 86 MICH. L. REV. 255 (1987). 
4. Presentation of the Portrait of the Honorable Wade Mccree, Cincinnati, Ohio, June 11, 
1981, reprinted in 725 F.2d C, CII, CIII (6th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Portrait Presentation]. 
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room and came to join me at the elevator. He was somewhat distraught 
and without waiting, he burst out: "Well, he beat me. He beat me." -
then a pause - "But he made me like it." Throughout Judge McCree's 
career, his gift for administering the law helped people to understand -
and accept it, even when losing. 5 
Judge McCree's published decisions in the United States District 
Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals show a man dedicated to 
the law and compassionate in all of his dealings. I would like to dis-
cuss a few of his opinions, both at the district court level and the cir-
cuit court level, recognizing that in no way ·is this a comprehensive 
treatment of his judicial work, but merely examples of his brilliance 
and his concern for the protection of individual rights and the rule of 
law. 
I should point out generally that Judge McCree was a stickler for 
language. He received excellent training at the Boston Latin School, 
Fisk University, and Harvard Law School, and he used that education 
in writing his opinions. He would go over opinions line by line with 
his clerks, often taking hours to make sure that the language was per-
fect. 6 Moreover, he had a great sense of justice. He would never 
knowingly issue an opinion that was not good law. While he always 
strived to render a just decision protecting individual rights, he would 
never bend the law. 
One of the district court opinions of which Judge McCree was 
most proud was United States v. Caplan. 7 In Caplan, defendants 
moved to quash search warrants that were based in part on informa-
tion received from a pen register that gave IRS agents information on 
telephone numbers called. 8 The information obtained from these pen 
registers was part of the basis for the issuance of the search warrants in 
the case. Judge McCree granted the motions to suppress, finding that 
the recording of the numbers was an interception within the meaning 
of the law. He said: 
I find that an "interception" took place under the circumstances here, 
and that ... no authority can permit this. To the government's argu-
ment that no "communication" was intercepted, defendants, in open 
court, demonstrated that it was possible to dial a number and to permit 
5. Portrait Presentation, supra note 4, at CIV. 
6. In Dixie Plantation Co. v. Duncan, 383 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1967), Judge McCree, writing 
for the Sixth Circuit, affirmed a district court judgment, appealed by a tobacco producer, uphold-
ing a burley tobacco allotment by the county agricultural stabilization and conservation commit-
tee of 1.37 acres for the producer's farm. Though this was a very complex case, Judge McCree 
was able to write a clear opinion in only two-and-a-half pages. 
7. 255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966). 
8. A pen register is a device attached to a telephone line that records the number of every 
outgoing telephone call. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1021 (5th ed. 1979). 
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the phone to ring a specified number of times, and then to hang up. 
When this was done, the pen register dutifully recorded the fact that the 
number was called. History affords us the illustration of a pre-arranged 
signal. Paul Revere's associate, who hung a lantern in the Old North 
church, would hardly have been exculpated at a trial for treason if he 
argued that he was not sending a communication, but was only illumi-
nating the belfry. It seems that if the agents entertained no misgivings 
about the use of the pen register constituting an "interception" here, 
they would have frankly requested its employment instead of having re-
sorted to the technique of stimulating the telephone company to do so by 
suggestion. The government should not be permitted to instigate an in-
vestigation that is unlawful any more than it can instigate conduct that is 
unlawful, as the entrapment cases teach.9 
This case broke new ground by finding that the pen register data, 
where lines were capable of interstate transportation, violated wiretap 
laws, and by extending the right of privacy through statutory con-
struction. Caplan was totally consistent with Judge McCree's interest 
in protecting the individual. 
In another significant district court decision, Evans v. Kropp, 10 a 
habeas corpus proceeding, a police guard had information concerning 
the mental illness of a state prisoner. This information was never 
transmitted to the sentencing judge by the prosecutor or defendant's 
retained counsel. The sentencing judge accepted petitioner's plea of 
guilty to second-degree murder, and sentenced him to life imprison-
ment after state remedies were exhausted. Petitioner filed a writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which came before Judge 
Mccree. 
Judge McCree granted the writ, holding the proceedings did not 
comport with due process. He found that the prosecutor was charge-
able with the knowledge of the treating psychiatrist's diagnosis and 
recommendation of a sanity hearing, which was communicated to 
guards in charge of the prisoner in the hospital. He indicated his pref-
erence for protecting the individual rights of the accused against the 
negligent failure of the government and the courts to find out the ac-
tual facts of the accused's condition. With regard to the accountabil-
ity of the government, Judge McCree stated: 
[T]he state is accountable for all information which comes within the 
knowledge of its agents while prosecuting a criminal matter, so that the 
knowledge of the police is clearly chargeable to the prosecutor, who is 
also merely an agent of the state. 11 
He also expanded the concept of effective assistance of counsel, 
9. 255 F. Supp. at 808 (citations omitted). 
IO. 254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Mich. 1966). 
11. 254 F. Supp. at 222. 
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holding that an attorney's decision that his defendant would be far 
better off in a state prison from which he would be eligible for parole 
in ten years than he would be in a state hospital for the criminally 
insane, which influenced the attorney's failure to notify the court of 
the client's mental condition, deprived defendant of his guaranteed 
rights under the fourteenth amendment. Judge McCree elaborated on 
the role of an attorney: 
I believe that no lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the right to make 
such a judgment. Regardless of his personal views, he may not withhold 
from the court such critical information as the diagnosed mental incom-
petency of his client and of his consequent possible inability to stand 
trial. I find that Mr. O'Connell's failure to inform the court of his cli-
ent's mental condition deprived petitioner of the effective assistance of 
counsel which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 
Once again, Judge Mccree showed his great concern for protecting 
the rights of individuals within the law and the Constitution. 
Judge McCree was also concerned with giving a plaintiff his day in 
court, but only if this was possible within the bounds of the law. In 
Gaetzi v. Carling Brewery Co., 13 a case cited numerous times, he dealt 
with a conflicts of law issue over the proper statute of limitations in an 
antitrust action. Plaintiff, a former distributor of beer, was suing the 
brewery supplier for wrongful termination of the plaintiff's distribu-
torship. The supplier moved for partial summary judgment on the 
ground that the cause of action was barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations applicable to private antitrust actions, 15 U.S.C. § 156. 
Plaintiff asserted the six-year state statute of limitations applied. After 
determining when the cause of action accrued, Judge McCree held 
that the four-year statute applied, even though the cause of action ac-
crued after the enactment date of the federal statute, but before its 
effective date. Recognizing that Congress allowed a six-month grace 
period before the effective date of the four-year statute to allow per-
sons with viable claims under longer state limitations statutes to bring 
suit, he noted that "plaintiff here was not in that position," and so he 
applied the shorter limitations statute. 14 Here, plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion accrued on November 7, 1955, the federal statute was effective 
January 7, 1956, yet plaintiff did not bring suit until October 30, 1961. 
On the other hand, if a plaintiff complied with the necessary stat-
ute of limitations, Judge McCree would rule within the law to allow 
the parties to obtain fair results on the merits of the case. In Crowe v. 
12. 254 F. Supp. at 222. 
13. 205 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mich. 1962). 
14. 205 F. Supp. at 619. 
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Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 15 Judge McCree wrote authorita-
tively on the right of a plaintiff to obtain production of crewmen's 
statements taken on behalf of a railroad company immediately after an 
accident, even though such crewmen were subject to deposition. He 
found there was good cause for production of such statements, stating: 
[D]iscovery should not be less available where relevant, non-privileged 
information is contained in a document than when such information is 
lodged in the memory of a witness .... In view of the liberal spirit of the 
rules, the court should be disposed to grant such discovery as will ac-
complish full disclosure of facts, eliminate surprise, and promote 
settlement. 
. . . When both parties are apprised of all facts pertaining to a case, 
the issues can be narrowed, the trial shortened, surprise avoided, and the 
chances for a fair and amicable settlement enhanced. 16 
Crowe has had a great influence in the development of the law of 
discovery. 
Judge McCree was effective in resolving disputes in chambers as 
well as in the courtroom. In an unpublished case, Ross v. Bannan, 11 
plaintiffs, inmates of a state prison and communicants of the Muslim 
faith, brought suit under the federal Civil Rights Act alleging that the 
prison authorities had denied plaintiffs permission to receive, or order 
by mail, copies of the Muslims' daily prayer book, and that the author-
ities had refused to permit plaintiffs "to correspond with their spiritual 
leader." In a conference in chambers, Judge McCree moved the par-
ties to an understanding in this highly sensitive dispute. The officials 
agreed to allow plaintiffs to receive their prayer books, and agreed that 
plaintiffs could correspond with their spiritual advisor, but subject to 
the same controls as other prison inmates. Through his dispute reso-
lution skills, Judge McCree helped the parties reach a fair, equitable, 
and speedy agreement. 
If a plaintiff appeared to have a viable claim, Judge Mccree would 
broadly construe the jurisdiction of the federal court. In Chovan v. 
E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 18 he wrote authoritatively on the effect 
of a state long-arm statute on limited personal jurisdiction. Chovan 
involved a diversity action in Michigan for the death of a miner killed 
by the premature explosion of dynamite. Mccree held that the long-
arm statute allowed exercising jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
that annually loaded about fifteen million feet of fuse exceeding 
15. 29 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Mich. 1961). 
16. 29 F.R.D. at 150-51. 
17. No. 21429 (E.D. Mich. June 4, 1962). 
18. 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1963). 
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$130,000 in value onto common carriers destined for points in Michi-
gan. He held these contacts with Michigan were sufficient to subject 
the company to limited personal jurisdiction.19 
Judge McCree's appointment to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit in 1966 was uniformly hailed as an out-
standing one. He had established a solid record as a legal scholar 
deeply devoted to the law and the Constitution, and at all times anx-
ious to protect individual rights. He wrote many significant opinions 
as an appellate judge, and, in this short tribute, I can only briefly dis-
cuss a few of them. 
One of the most significant was Mitchell v. Johnson, 20 a habeas 
corpus case. The district court had denied the writ, which raised the 
question of whether an indigent prisoner has a right to appointed 
counsel after the first appeal in state court has been exhausted, and the 
only remedy remaining in state court was the seeking of leave to ap-
peal from the State Supreme Court for a discretionary review. Judge 
Mccree reversed, on behalf of a unanimous court, finding the govern-
ment's argument not persuasive that, because appellant had already 
taken one appeal with the aid of counsel, the Constitution required no 
more. Significantly, he said: 
The temple of criminal justice does not have three stories for the affluent 
and only two for the indigent. We conclude that the constitutional prin-
ciples enunciated in Griffin, Burns and Douglas require appointment of 
counsel to assist indigent appellants in application to the Michigan 
Supreme Court for discretionary review. Our decision is supported by 
the spirit, if not by the express command, of the Sixth Amendment right 
to assistance of counsel, applicable to the states in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.21 
Judge McCree was most meticulous in protecting the rights of de-
fendants, as well as those of the government, in criminal procedural 
matters. He was very interested in criminal procedure, and particu-
larly desirous to see that the state at no time would overreach to send 
a defendant to jail. 
An interesting case on this subject is Johns v. Perini, 22 which in-
volved an appeal from a district court's deni1;1l of a writ of habeas 
corpus. After reviewing the transcript of the state trial court proceed-
ings, Judge Mccree noted that the record disclosed the existence of 
documentary evidence that would have supported petitioner's defense 
of an alibi, yet no attempt had been made to introduce such evidence 
19. 217 F. Supp. at 813. 
20. 488 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1973). 
21. 488 F.2d at 353. 
22. 440 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972). 
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after objection by the prosecuting attorney. The transcript was insuffi-
cient, according to Judge Mccree, to determine whether the petitioner 
had been denied effective assistance of counsel, and required an evi-
dentiary hearing. He held: 
Although it appears that the trial court could, under the Ohio statute, 
have excluded even appellant's own alibi testimony . . . it apparently 
exercised its statutory discretion to permit Johns to testify. It is not clear 
whether defense counsel made a tactical decision not to introduce the 
documentary evidence or whether he was precluded from doing so be-
cause he had neglected to give the statutory notice. In the latter event, 
since this was appellant's only defense, issuance of the writ would be 
dictated . . . . 23 
The court then remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether 
a negligent omission by counsel precluded presentation of evidence of 
an alibi in support of appellant's only defense. Once more, Judge Mc-
cree showed his deep concern for the protection of individual rights, 
and insisted upon adequate judicial procedures. 
In many criminal cases, Judge McCree was often the dissenter.24 
In every one of such cases, he was concerned with procedural flaws or 
denial of a defendant's constitutional rights. In United States v. 
Hoffa, 25 he dissented from affirmance of the conviction because of the 
possibility that the prosecuting attorney may have relied upon per-
jured testimony in the case. He pointed out that, had the government 
revealed that the witness had perjured himself during the trial, defense 
counsel could have used that fact to impeach a key government wit-
ness. He found the majority opinion unconvincing on that point, and 
felt that the prosecutor's actions may have denied the defendant due 
process. 
Judge McCree wrote in every area of the law, and always lucidly, 
concisely, and effectively. In Davis v. School District of Pontiac, 26 
Judge McCree, writing for the court, affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court, holding that the record supported the determination that 
school officials were responsible for the racial imbalance in the school 
system, including the purposeful segregation in the administration and 
faculty. He stated the district court properly fulfilled its duty to eradi-
cate the effects of past unlawful discrimination. Judge McCree wrote 
23. 440 F.2d at 579 (citations omitted). 
24. See, e.g., Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1251 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
922 (1972) (McCree, J., dissenting) (contending that a strike force of police officers and IRS 
agents had conducted an illegal search of defendant's home). 
25. 437 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). 
26. 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971). 
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this opinion, which showed great courage and incisive scholarship, 
during the school busing crises throughout the country. 
Judge McCree was also concerned with the protection of the envi-
ronment, as was exemplified in Environmental Defense Fund v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority. 27 Writing for the court, he affirmed a district 
court's granting of a preliminary injunction to stop construction of the 
TVA's dam and reservoir project. Judge McCree held that an environ-
mental impact statement is required whenever a governmental agency 
intends to take steps that will result in significant environmental im-
pact, whether the steps were planned before or after the effective date 
of the National Environmental Protection Act, and even if the steps 
represent the final stages of the government plan. 
Judge McCree further showed his concern for civil rights, and the 
protection of basic constitutional rights, in Glasson v. City of Louis-
ville. 28 In Glasson, a police officer forcibly took a poster from a young 
woman, peacefully standing on a public sidewalk, and destroyed it. It 
was a protest sign, and she was standing on a motorcade route that the 
President of the United States would soon be travelling. Action was 
brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) for abridgement of 
rights guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. The dis-
trict court, sitting without a jury, determined, after trial, that appel-
lant could not recover damages under § 1983 because the police had 
acted reasonably in destroying her poster, and she would not recover 
damages under§ 1985(3) because she failed to prove that the destruc-
tion of her poster was motivated by an impermissible discriminatory 
animus. The poster, which she was holding peacefully while waiting 
for the President to pass, said: "Lead us to hate and kill poverty, dis-
ease and ignorance, not each other." Judge McCree, writing for the 
Court, reversed, in an eloquent opinion: 
To permit police officers to prohibit the expression of ideas which they 
believe to be "detrimental" or "injurious" to the President of the United 
States or to punish for incitement or breach of the peace the peaceful 
communication of such messages because other persons are provoked 
and seek to take violent action against the speaker would subvert the 
First Amendment, and would incorporate into that constitutional guar-
antee a "heckler's veto" which would empower an audience to cut off the 
expression of a speaker with whom it disagreed .... 
. . . Miss Glasson ... was engaged in activity protected by the First 
Amendment and ... the destruction of the sign by Louisville police of-
ficers ... deprived her of that right.29 
27. 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). 
28. 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975). 
29. 518 F.2d at 905·06 (footnote omitted). Judge McCree was not reluctant to dissent in 
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Judge McCree did not hesitate to discuss important constitutional 
principles in his opinions, such as federalism and the separation of 
powers. United States v. Carson 30 was a suit by the government 
against a borrower under a federal loan program, and a livestock bro-
ker, who, upon borrower's request, sold livestock in which the govern-
ment held a mortgage interest. The broker retained only a percentage 
of the proceeds, amounting to his commission. Under state law, the 
government could only recover from the broker that percentage. 
Judge McCree, writing for the majority, reversed the district court, 
holding that federal law applied and that the broker was liable to the 
government for the fair market value of the livestock at the time of the 
conversion. Leading into his analysis of federalism, Judge McCree 
commented: "Far more is involved here than a few head of cattle. 
This case raises serious issues both of federalism and of the separation 
of powers of the branches of the federal government."31 He followed 
that with an extensive and scholarly analysis of federalism: 
Where a decision is likely to have a substantial effect on the implementa-
tion of a federal program, then a federal court should declare a rule con-
sistent with the program's demands. Congress, of course, is the primary 
source of federal law, and the federal courts must adhere to the intent of 
Congress whenever this intent is discernible. When congressional intent 
is not expressed or otherwise ascertainable, however, the courts may, 
within reasonable bounds, utilize the techniques of the common law to 
reach the appropriate rules for disposition of controversies before 
them .... 
. . . The presence of a federal program permits the federal courts to 
make a choice, but does not of itself determine what the choice will be. 
In the instant situation, however, formulation of a uniform federal rule, 
rather than adoption of the laws of the several states as the federal rule, 
is the more appropriate alternative.32 
In another interesting case, Stifel v. Hopkins, 33 a federal prisoner 
brought a diversity action against his parents and the attorney who 
represented him throughout criminal proceedings. The district court 
held that the prisoner could not acquire domicile in the state of his 
incarceration, and thus dismissed the action for lack of diversity juris-
order to protect civil rights when he felt that individuals were being deprived of constitutional 
protections. See, e.g .. Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977) (male 
worker discharged for violating code prohibiting long hair for male employees); Robinson v. 
Shelby Co. Bd. of Educ., 467 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1972) (defining extent of constitutional man· 
date for desegregation). 
30. 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967). 
31. 372 F.2d at 431. 
32. 372 F.2d at 432. 
33. 477 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1973). 
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diction. Judge McCree, writing for the majority, reversed, holding 
that "a litigant will not be precluded from establishing a domicile 
within a state for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction solely be-
cause his presence there initially resulted from circumstances beyond 
his control."34 Once more, Judge McCree showed his practical ap-
proach to judicial problems, protecting the rights of individuals to 
have their day in court. 
Two more opinions, one a dissent and one a concurring opinion, 
deserve comment. In Clinton Street Greater Bethlehem Church v. City 
of Detroit, 35 the majority affirmed a master's denial of certification of 
the church's membership in a class of persons entitled to recover for 
losses sustained due to the city's condemnation proceedings, thus de-
nying the church damage recovery. In dissent, Judge McCree held 
that the record was inadequate for the master to make such a determi-
nation, and that the case should be remanded to the master for find-
ings concerning the value of the church's property as of the time of the 
takings. With his usual eloquence, Judge McCree started his dissent by 
stating: "If anything is clear from a study of the voluminous record in 
this case, it is that the [church] has been pillaged and despoiled in the 
past two decades as thoroughly as any ancient city at the onslaught of 
raiding barbarians. "36 
In Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education,37 the major-
ity affirmed a district court's choice of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare's plan for school desegregation. The plan had 
allegedly placed the burden of desegregation disproportionately on 
black students and their parents. Judge McCree concurred, stating, 
inter alia, that "[o]ur opinion should not be construed in any way as a 
qualification of the principle that a district court has an obligation to 
endeavor to distribute the burden of integration equitably on all races 
and that any deviation from this norm, without a compelling justifica-
tion, is impermissible."38 Judge McCree explained that the court did 
not address this issue in order to insure that at least some kind of plan 
was in effect: 
I agree that we should not now disturb the District Court's approval of 
the HEW plan and possibly encourage the kind of delay and inaction 
that has caused this case to pend for 17 years. Plaintiffs may seek modifi-
cation of the court's order on the ground that the plan places a dispro-
34. 477 F.2d at 1126. 
35. 484 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1973). 
36. 484 F.2d at 189. 
37. 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1972). 
38. 463 F.2d at 752. 
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portionate burden on black children and their parents, and this issue can 
be litigated and determined before the beginning of the 1972-73 school 
year. In this way, the disproportionate burden asserted by plaintiffs will 
exist at most for only a short period of time and will amount to no more 
than a transitory phase (assuming the absence of sufficient justification 
for maintaining it permanently) in the over-all creation of a unitary 
school system. 39 
What appeared to be approval of a faulty desegregation plan by Judge 
Mccree and the Sixth Circuit was actually a big step toward a unitary 
school system. 
Wade McCree was not only an outstanding judge, he was deeply 
dedicated to the improvement of the law, and active in many law-re-
lated activities. He served for many years on the Executive Commit-
tee of the American Law Institute, was a Fellow of the American Bar 
Foundation, and a member of numerous boards and commissions de-
voted to the improvement of the law. I served with him on two of 
these. He and I were both members of the Advisory Committee for 
Appellate Justice. This committee, made up of legal scholars, judges 
(both trial and appellate level), and lawyers, was concerned with im-
proving the efficiency of the appellate procedure. The Committee met 
for a period of two years and ultimately issued a very comprehensive 
report, to which Judge McCree made significant contributions. 
I also served with him as a member of the Board of the Institute 
for Court Management. The Institute was largely responsible for de-
veloping the profession of court administration, and most Court Ad-
ministrators today are Fellows of the Institute. Judge McCree was an 
excellent member of the Board. He attended meetings without fail, 
and always was most constructive in his comments. The Board was 
much more effective because of him. 
In addition, Judge McCree was very much interested in continuing 
judicial education, and served for a long period of time as a member of 
the Board of the National Judicial College at the University of Ne-
vada. This group is the premier training group for state trial and ap-
pellate judges in the country, and runs some forty different programs 
every year. It is largely responsible for elevating the quality of the 
state judiciary. As a very effective and active member of its board, 
Judge McCree made major and significant contributions to the im-
provement of continuing judicial education. 
In an article as short as this one, it is impossible to thoroughly 
analyze and present Judge McCree's contributions to the jurispru-
dence of this country. Suffice it to say that they are significant and 
39. 463 F.2d at 752. 
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great. Judge McCree was, above all, a fine lawyer and a fine judge. He 
was always concerned with protecting the constitutional rights of all, 
no matter how insignificant the rights and individuals appeared to be. 
As Judge Lively says in his eloquent tribute: "He was surely born to 
be ajudge."40 Nothing truer could be said about Wade H. McCree, Jr. 
The bench lost a great judge when he left it to become Solicitor Gen-
eral.41 He was missed then, and he is missed today. 
40. See Lively, Wade H. McCree, Jr.: Born To Be A Judge, 86 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1987). 
41. Judge McCree often told me that he thought the Solicitor General's job was the best 
lawyer's job in the country. In saying this, he always emphasized that it was the best lawyer's 
job. He made no effort to compare it to the judiciary, and often longed to return to the bench. 
He often quoted his daughter Kathy as asking him why he would give up a life tenancy to take a 
tenancy at will when he became Solicitor General. He said to me many times he really had no 
good answer to that question. 
